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European economic growth has been weak, compared to the US, since the 80s. In previous work
(Krueger and Kumar, 2003), we argued that the European focus on specialized, vocational education
might have been effective during the 60s and 70s, but resulted in a growth gap relative to the US
during the subsequent information age, when new technologies emerged more rapidly. In this paper,
we extend our framework to assess the quantitative importance of education policy, when compared
to labor market rigidity and product market regulation, other policy differences more commonly
suggested to be responsible for US-Europe differences. A "decomposition" exercise using a
calibrated version of our model assigns a major role to education policy in explaining US-Europe
growth differences.
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European economic growth has been weak, compared to the US, since the 80s. This is true
for the growth rate of per capita GDP as well as for labor productivity in the manufacturing
sector. During this period, Europe has also lagged in technology adoption, resulting in a
“technology gap” with respect to the US. In previous work (Krueger and Kumar, 2003), we
developed a model of education and technology adoption to argue that European focus on
specialized, vocational education might have worked well during the 60s and 70s, but not
during the subsequent information age when new technologies emerged at a more rapid pace.
How important is this policy diﬀerence, compared with other explanations, qualitatively and
quantitatively? To answer these questions, in this paper we extend the above model to
incorporate labor and product market regulations.
In the model, households decide between acquiring general education, which allows them
to work in high-tech ﬁrms that adopt new technologies, and less costly skill-speciﬁc education,
which is of value only to low-tech ﬁrms that use established production methods. Education
policy is captured by the relative subsidy to each type of education. High-tech ﬁrms draw
a workforce-speciﬁc productivity for the new technology, and decide on whether to proceed
with production and pay a portion of proﬁts toward regulation costs, or ﬁre the workers
at a cost, and redraw a new productivity-workforce combination. The fraction of proﬁts
paid to the government is intended to capture the costs of bureaucracy and product market
regulations, while the ﬁring cost serves as a proxy for labor market distortions. A ﬁrm
that decides to proceed with production ﬁrst chooses the extent of technology adoption; the
rate at which new technologies becomes available is exogenously speciﬁed, and limits the
technology improvement chosen by the ﬁrm. Along a Balanced Growth Path (BGP), output
grows at the chosen rate of technology adoption.
Our main analytical results are as follows. First, a higher ﬁring or regulation cost causes
adopting ﬁrms to accept inferior productivity draws, lowering wages and the incentive to
acquire general education. The expected growth rate decreases. A higher general education
subsidy increases attainment and lowers relative wages for adoption workers. This may in-
crease the rate of technology adoption and growth, even though ﬁrms become more willing to
accept lower productivity matches. Finally, an increase in the exogenous rate of technologi-
cal change may increase the growth gap between economies that focus on diﬀerent types of
education, with the economy geared towards skill-speciﬁc education falling (further) behind.
We then calibrate our model under the assumption that the US adopts new technologies
and grows at the maximal rate, irrespective of whether the exogenous rate of technological
change is low or high. Therefore, observed US manufacturing labor productivity growth rates
equal the rates of exogenous technological change common to the US and Europe. Given our
choice of policy parameters for the US and Europe based on independent empirical evidence,
our empirical targets for assessing success of the model are European general education
1attainment and its productivity growth rate — roughly the same as that of the US when
technological change is low, but lower when technological change is high.1 In other words,
our choice of the exogenous rate of technological change enables, but by no means guarantees
the quantitative success of our model. Once we have established that the model performs
well quantitatively, we use it to study counterfactual policies for Europe that would bridge
its growth gap with the US. While a decrease in the ﬁring costs and, to a lesser degree,
regulation costs help reduce this gap, a change in education policy explains most of it.
It is important to note that existing growth models, such as those discussed in Stokey and
Rebelo (1995), will not yield the implication that two economies growing at potential can
diverge when the rate of technological change increases. In a standard model of investment
in physical and human capital, diﬀerences in relative subsidies to education have the poten-
tial to generate diﬀerences in the US and European growth rates; however, to obtain the
above-mentioned divergence result, modeling education acquisition and technology adoption
constrained by the potential rate, as we have done, appears to be necessary.
Relating our study to the existing literature, explanations for US-Europe growth diﬀer-
ences are proposed in the collection of papers in Lawrence and Schultze (1987). While the
European regulatory environment and labor market frictions receive extensive attention here
and elsewhere, we focus on another reason suggested in that volume, to which little attention
has been paid. In their words, “Workers must have general training to adapt to new tasks,
and European education, which has encouraged apprenticeships that provide speciﬁcs k i l l s ,
must adapt.”
As in our study, the diminished role of skill-speciﬁc education during times of rapid tech-
nological progress is also a feature of Galor and Tsiddon (1997) and Galor and Moav (2000).
Unlike these papers, we jointly model the technology adoption and education acquisition
decision to focus on the eﬀect of education policy on growth. Wasmer (2003) argues that
European workers invest more in speciﬁc human capital and US workers in general human
capital because of diﬀerences in labor market institutions. This ﬁnding does not preclude
the educational system as an independent source of US-Europe diﬀerences.2
Our formalization of labor market rigidities and product market regulations also has
ample precedence in the literature. Pries and Rogerson (2001) use higher ﬁring costs in
Europe to capture labor market rigidities, which in their work increases the duration of
unemployment through tougher hiring standards. Nagypál (2002) argues that high dismissal
costs in Europe hinder learning about match quality and reduce average productivity. Our
modeling of product market regulations as a cost is motivated by Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and
Boylaud (1999), who identify barriers to entrepreneurship as an important component.
1We focus on Germany and Italy for our calibration, as these countries’ education systems are most
diﬀerent from the US. They are therefore ideal candidates for a quantitative investigation of our hypothesis.
2This is true in particular because the vocational focus in Europe predates the rigidity in its labor markets,
which may drive Wasmer’s observations. See Bertocchi and Spagat (1998).
2The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief discussion of
the stylized facts that motivate our study. The economic environment is presented in Section
3, and the BGP is characterized in Section 4. Section 5 discusses our calibration, and the
quantitative results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
In this section, we present a brief summary of the stylized facts that motivate us.
1. A growth gap between the US and Europe has emerged since the 80s in per capita
growth as well as in labor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector. Scarpetta
et. al. (2000), for instance, provide data on relative manufacturing output per person to
show that the productivity level for Germany, as in several other European countries, was
converging toward the US level until 1980, but the gap has widened since then. They also
argue that the manufacturing sector has played a more important role than services in terms
of aggregate productivity growth. Growth rates of manufacturing output per worker from
the European Competitiveness Report 2001 are presented in Table 1. It can be seen that US
labor productivity has outpaced that of the European Union in the 90s, and possibly from
earlier on.3
Table 1




As mentioned in the introduction, the US growth rates will be used as proxies for the
exogenous rates of technological change, while European growth rates will be empirical tar-
gets. In Section 5, we tie the independent evidence from Cummings and Violante (2002)
and Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) on the increase in the rate of embodied technological
change during the period under consideration to the rates we assume.
3The manufacturing productivity growth rates for Germany and Italy were equal to or higher than those
of the US during the earlier period of 1970-79. BLS data shows that growth of manufacturing output per hour
during 1979-2001 was also lower for Germany (2.4%) and Italy (2.2%) when compared to the US (3.2%).
Germany’s productivity growth increased from 2.0% during 1986-1990 to 3.8% during 1991-2000, but this
ﬁgure is confounded by the uniﬁcation and catchup growth of former East Germany. Italy did better than the
US during 1986-1990 (3.8%), but during 1991-2000, its labor productivity growth of 2.2% was only half of US
growth. We use the average EU growth rates as targets to smooth over country diﬀerences within Europe.
The productivity growth gap is even more pronounced in technology-driven industries such as oﬃce ma-
chineries and computers, pharmaceuticals and aircraft; 8.3% for the US in the 90s and 3.5% for the EU.
32. There is also evidence that, with the exception of Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands,
a technology gap emerged between the US and Europe during the same period, whether
measured by the share of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) equipment
investment as a share of total investment or by the contribution of ICT capital to out-
put growth. The contribution of ICT capital to output growth has been increasing for all
countries since the 80s, but the gap between the US and European countries has also been
increasing. Schreyer (2000) reports that during 1990-1996, 0.42 percentage points of per-
capita output growth in the US can be attributed to ITC capital-deepening, up from 0.28
points in the second half of the 80s. In Germany, these numbers increased from 0.12 to only
0.18.4 Bessen (2002) estimates that technology adjustment costs in the US reached a peak
of 90 cents for every dollar invested during 1984-88, and about 10% of the manufacturing
sector output. These facts motivate our modeling of costly technological adoption driving
US-Europe growth diﬀerences.
3. There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in educational focus between the US and Europe, with
the US focusing on general education and Europe on vocational education. Vocational
enrollment rates at the upper secondary level and beyond are much higher in Europe. On
the other hand, in the US the net entry rate into universities, where general education is
primarily imparted, is more than twice the rates of most European countries. This results
in higher university attainment in the US labor force. The general education attainment in
the US, calculated to be 74.5%, is used in the calibration in Section 5, while the attainment
in Europe (of 30%), will be a crucial empirical target.
While the percentage of GDP devoted to primary and secondary education was about
the same for the US and Germany in 1997, the percentage devoted to tertiary education
was signiﬁcantly higher in the US. Consequently, the expenditure per student relative to
GDP per capita on tertiary education was higher in the US than in Germany, whereas for
post-secondary non-tertiary (vocational) education the situation is reversed. As shown in
detail in Section 5, OECD data suggests that the ratio of general to vocational education
subsidies corresponding to our model is 2.55 for the US, but only around 1 for Germany and
Italy. These will be pre-determined parameters in our calibration exercise.
We are interested in exploring the strength of the education policy channel relative to
other policies. As explained in Section 5, the policy parameter for the product market friction
is chosen to match entry costs of nearly zero for the US and 5.8% of gross national income
for Germany. The policy parameter for the labor market friction is chosen to match ﬁring
costs of nearly zero for the US and six weeks of average wage for Europe.
Given our hypothesis that these stylized facts are related, we now present a model with
4Italy experienced a similar trend. Stiroh (2002) shows that IT-intensive industries experienced signiﬁ-
cantly larger labor productivity gains than other industries; he also ﬁnds a strong correlation between IT
capital accumulation and labor productivity growth.
4a household education choice and costly technology adoption choice by ﬁrms.
3 The Environment
The economy is populated by a continuum of households and two continua of identical ﬁrms.
Firms in one sector, the adopting or high-tech sector, potentially adopt new technologies
in every period, and ﬁrms in the nonadopting or low-tech sector do not.5 There is a single
nonstorable consumption good in each time period and households supply labor to the ﬁrms.
In this section we describe the maximization problems of a typical ﬁrm in each sector and
of a typical household, and ﬁnally deﬁne equilibrium and a balanced growth path.
3.1 Firms and Technology Adoption
All ﬁrms in our economy are owned by inﬁnitely lived entrepreneurs. Proﬁts are immediately
consumed since entrepreneurs, like workers, do not have access to an intertemporal storage
technology or long-lived assets.
At each point of time there is a single ﬁnal consumption good in the economy, which serves
as the numeraire. The aggregate technology that is freely available for usage in production
by all ﬁrms in the current period is denoted by A. It is the result of past technology adoption
decisions (which are described below) and taken as given by all ﬁrms in the current period.
A ﬁrm in the sector that does not adopt new technologies in the current period produces
output according to
Yn = Aβ (Hn)
θ ,
where Yn is output of a typical nonadopting ﬁrm and Hn are the eﬀective units of labor
employed; β > 0 is a parameter that governs the relative productivity of the low-tech and
the high-tech sector, and θ < 1
2 is an intensity parameter. As will be described below, each
worker in the low-tech sector has productivity h>1. Therefore, if the typical nonadopting
ﬁrm hires nn workers from the competitive labor market, the above production function can
be written as Yn = Aβ (nnh)
θ. Every nonadopting ﬁrm takes the wage Wn per eﬃciency
unit in the sector as given and maximizes proﬁts.
Firms in the technology-adopting (“high-tech”) sector can choose the level of technology
a0 with which to produce today, subject to the constraint
a0 ≤ Af,
where Af is the productivity level of the frontier technology. This frontier technology is
assumed to grow at a constant exogenous rate λ; next period’s frontier technology is given
5We abstract from important industrial organization issues such as ﬁrm entry and exit decisions to keep
our model analytically and computationally tractable. However, in Section 6.3, we explore the sensitivity of
our quantitative analysis to incorporating entry.
5by A0
f = λAf. An adopting ﬁrm incurs a technology adoption cost A
2 (a0 − A)2 if it decides
to use technology a0 in the current period and the freely available “common practice” is A.
It is proportional to the complexity of the common practice A a n ds t r i c t l yc o n v e xi nt h e
distance of the technological “leap”.6
The output of a typical ﬁrm in the adopting sector Ya is given by
Ya = a0 (Ha)
θ ,
where Ha are the eﬀective units of labor employed. As will be described below, Eh is the
stochastic productivity per worker in this ﬁrm. Therefore, if the typical adopting ﬁrm hires
na workers, the above production function can be written as Ya = a0 (naEh)
θ. Adopting
ﬁrms take wages Wa per eﬃciency unit as given.7
3.2 Labor and Product Market Regulations
We model product market regulations and labor market rigidities in a highly stylized way.
We discuss these model features while describing the sequence of events within a given period
for adopting ﬁrms.
1. A representative adopting ﬁrm hires na number of workers.
2. The ﬁrm draws a worker productivity level Eh ∼ F(.), with associated continuous
probability density function e f.We assume that Eh is perfectly correlated across workers
and that draws are independent over time. The productivity draw can be viewed as
speciﬁc to an adopting ﬁr ma n dt h ew o r k f o r c ei th i r e s ;i tc a p t u r e sh o we ﬀectively the
ﬁrm can produce the ﬁnal good if it proceeds with the current implementation of the
new technology.
3. Given the above productivity draw for its workforce, the ﬁrm decides whether to pro-
ceed with the implementation of a new technology and produce the ﬁnal good accord-
ingly, using the current workforce. If the ﬁrm does not implement the technology, it
pays a ﬁring cost A∗fnaEh, instantly hires new workers na and draws again. Here, f
6If A is viewed as the number of machines, the cost of retooling each machine will be constant on a
balanced growth path.
7Since a ﬁrms’ technology does not feature constant returns to scale, it is clear that scale matters in our
setup. We have exogenously set the measure of ﬁrms in each sector to one, which pins down the scale. In
Section 6.3, we check whether this assumption matters quantitatively; it does not.
Mitchell (2002) presents evidence that TFP growth is negatively associated with plant size. Since in our
m o d e li tw i l lb et h ec a s et h a ta
0 ≥ A, ﬁrms with higher productivity levels (the high-tech ﬁrms) have higher
scale of production. Is this counter to the above evidence? It is not obvious whether the entity in our model
that chooses the technology should be a ﬁrm or a plant. Moreover, given our spillover assumption both types
of ﬁrms grow at the same rate on the BGP, albeit with a gap in their productivity levels. Despite this defense,
it is clear that our model is not set up to handle issues of ﬁrm size distribution.
6is the resource cost of ﬁring a unit of eﬀective labor; these resources are lost and don’t
beneﬁt anyone.8 If the ﬁrm decides to implement the technology after this “sampling”
phase, it chooses the extent of adoption, a0, optimally.9 In order to enter the output
(“product”) market to sell its product, the ﬁrm has to pay a fraction C of its proﬁts
from production. This can be viewed as the resource cost of administrative burden and
regulatory compliance arising from government policy; again these resources are lost.
The ﬁrm then pays workers wages Wa. Output net of wages, regulation, ﬁring and
adoption costs is consumed by the adopting entrepreneur as proﬁts.
Several elements of our formulation deserve further discussion. First, the interpretation
of the third stage is that there are several ways of implementing a new technology, and
some work well, given the labor force, and some do not. If a draw is viewed as building a
prototype, or conducting a trial run of production, ﬁring workers is akin to shutting the plant
down when the trial run fails, and attempting to re-implement the technology in a diﬀerent
way, hoping for a better productivity match between technology and workers. Since the
labor productivity Eh is workforce-speciﬁc, ﬁring workers is necessary in order to sample the
aggregate labor market for a diﬀerent set of workers.10
Second, given that Eh-draws are independent over time, no ﬁrm has an incentive to
revise its choice na after an unsuccessful draw. Third, we assume that new draws can
occur instantly, which allows us to abstract from discounting within a model period and
does not introduce other issues of timing within a period.11 Fourth, the cost parameters
f and C are intended to capture labor market frictions and product market regulations,
respectively. These costs are proportional to the current technology; this assumption yields
the empirically plausible implication that equilibrium costs are a constant fraction of GDP
in a growing economy.
8Qualitatively, little hinges on whether the ﬁring costs are paid per eﬀective unit or raw unit of labor;
indeed, in the calibration it is convenient to consider this as the cost per worker. Our assumption that these
costs are lost resources that do not beneﬁt anyone is in line with the “real resource costs which include the
costs associated with following whatever procedures are necessary in order to dismiss a worker,” assumed by
Pries and Rogerson (2001).
9For instance, a ﬁrm decides ﬁrst on whether it should computerize and what computers work best, before
i td e c i d e so nh o wm u c ho fi t so p e r a t i o n sw i l lb ec o m p u t e r i z e d .
10We are implicitly assuming that the output produced when the workers are ﬁred is zero; therefore, a
failed attempt need not only be viewed as a technology match that did not produce results, but also as a
production attempt that resulted in very low output.
11However, this will abstract from the cost of waiting for a better productivity draw.
73.3 The Firms’ Problems





with necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst order condition
Wn = θAβ (nnh)
θ−1 . (1)
Adopting ﬁrms have three choices to make in any given period, namely how many workers na
to hire, and then, conditional on a productivity draw, whether to go ahead with production
or whether to redraw, and ﬁnally, conditional on producing, the extent of adoption, a0.
Let’s ﬁrst consider the third stage of the problem. Conditional on hiring na workers and
a productivity draw, Eh, the ﬁrm solves
Π(Eh,n a)= m a x
a0≤Af
a0 (naEh)









In our framework, the workers are relatively passive and the ﬁrm does all the experiment-
ing. There is no bargaining and division of surplus as every worker, by assumption, is paid
her marginal product. While the extensive literature on individual worker-ﬁrm matching
has produced several useful insights, modeling such micro-mechanisms would lead us too far
astray from the main purpose of our paper of analyzing labor market friction as a concomi-
tant cause for US-Europe growth diﬀerentials. Therefore, it seems least ad-hoc to assume
that the ﬁrm pays workers their marginal product as wages. We can envision competitive
employment agencies that hire the labor force with general education and places it with
adoption ﬁrms, with the common understanding that workers would be placed in a diﬀerent
ﬁrm in case they are not paid competitively. We, therefore, have
Wa(Eh,n a)=θa0 (naEh)
θ−1 . (3)
When choosing the level of technology, a0, the ﬁr mt a k e st h e s ew a g e sa sg i v e na n db e y o n d
its control.
The third term in (2) captures the convex cost of upgrading technology, relative to the
current best practice. In Section (3.6), we elaborate on the assumption that the increase in
technology relative to the aggregate state, A, matters for the adoption cost, and also discuss
how technology adoption decisions of ﬁrms impact next period’s common practice.
In the second stage, the ﬁrm decides whether to go ahead with production, conditional
on a productivity draw Eh. Let V (Eh,n a) denote the period value of a ﬁrm with productivity
draw Eh and number of workers, na. The function V solves the functional equation
V (Eh,n a)= m a x
adopt, not adopt
½








8where the choice is between adopting and producing, or dismissing the workforce and hoping
for a more suitable workforce-productivity combination.12 We use “proceed” and “adopt”
interchangeably, as we do “not adopt” and “ﬁre” or “dismiss”. Let a0(Eh,n a) denote the
optimal technology choice of a ﬁrm with productivity draw Eh and workers na, and by
¯ Eh(na) ∈ [1,h] the threshold productivity draw above which a ﬁrm produces rather than
redraws. A unique such threshold exists since the ﬁrst part of the Bellman equation is strictly
increasing in Eh (as proﬁts are) and the second part is strictly decreasing in Eh.





3.4 Households and Education Decisions
There is a measure one of households that live for two periods. Households in our economy
make only one economic decision, namely which type of education to obtain in the ﬁrst
period of their lives. A household can opt to obtain vocational or general education. There
is a utility cost, e(a), of obtaining general education, which depends on an agent’s innate
ability a ∈ [0,1] for higher education. We assume that a is uniformly distributed across the
population; therefore, the cumulative distribution function is F(a)=a. We also assume that
e(a) is strictly decreasing in a.13
An agent who acquires vocational education earns a wage Wnh in the second period of
life. This agent can work in nonadopting ﬁrms with the technologies that were adopted
last period, and have become established practice this period. This agent’s task-speciﬁc
productivity is at its highest possible value, h, because the agent has received training for
that speciﬁc technology.
The beneﬁt that an agent obtains from general education is qualiﬁcation to work in the
adopting sector with newer technologies. While the technology per se is more productive,
the agent’s task-speciﬁc productivity, Eh, is stochastic and lies anywhere in [1,h].14 This
12Treating f, na > 0 as parametric, one can show that this Bellman equation (normalized by A) satisﬁes
Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions, and is indeed a contraction with modulus F (E
∗










π (Eh,n a)dF (Eh). In other words, even though there is no dis-
counting, the existence of positive ﬁring costs yields a well-behaved value function. As will be apparent
below, na =0cannot be an equilibrium.
13The use of the disutility function e(a) is a reduced form way of modeling probabilistic success in general
education that depends on ability.
14If we assume that there are only two skill levels, 1 and h, and that T is the probability that a generally
educated agent is unsuited for the new technology and ends up with the low productivity, the expected agent
productivity can be written as Eh = T · 1+( 1− T) · h. Hence the notation Eh. It is easier to deal with
Eh directly, instead of the underlying T. In Krueger and Kumar (2003) we study conditions under which it
is optimal for vocationally educated agents to work only in the nonadopting sector, and generally educated
agents to work only in the adopting sector; in this paper, we directly assume it.
9agent earns the random wage WaEh. Thus, when making the education decision, households
confront the trade-oﬀ between a higher cost of obtaining general education, net of any
subsidy, and a potentially higher wage in the second period of life.15
Given that an agent’s working life in the model is one period, it is diﬃcult to examine
if the above assumptions on worker productivity lead to the potentially counterfactual im-
plication that workers with general education face a riskier earning process. What can be
asserted is that randomness in Eh is needed only to accommodate a labor market friction
for adopting ﬁrms in the form of ﬁring costs during the sampling phase. Indeed, if the
above-mentioned employment agency provides perfect insurance to agents with general ed-
ucation and guarantees the certainty equivalent of the expected utility from wages, thereby
eliminating all risk, the education decision would be unaﬀected.16
We assume that households do not have access to insurance contracts against bad real-
izations of individual labor productivity and thus consume their wages in the second period
of life. Agents have preferences representable by the utility function
U(a)=Ig {E log(WaEh) − log(e(a)) + log(Sg)} +( 1− Ig){log(Wnh)+l o g ( Sv)} (5)
where Ig =1if the household chooses general education and Ig =0if the household chooses
vocational education.17 The expectation E is taken with respect to the stochastic produc-
tivity Eh.H e r eSg and Sv denote government subsidies for general and vocational education,
respectively.18 Given that all elements apart from e(a) in the utility function are independent
of a, it follows that there exists a threshold ability level a∗ above which households choose
to obtain general education and below which they obtain vocational education.
15A breakup of wage proﬁles by vocationally versus generally educated workers is hard to ﬁnd. CERGE-EI
(1997, VII.2) reports that the age-wage proﬁle for agents with vocational education in the Czech Republic
is very ﬂat, while the proﬁle for those with university education starts around the same wage, but shows
substantial growth with age. Similar diﬀerences are also reported for Canada by Allen (1998). This lends
some credibility to our assumption that vocationally educated agents work in the nonadopting sector and
do not experience the steep wage growth one would expect in a (high-tech) sector where technology changes
rapidly.
16See (18) below. A version of the model in Krueger and Kumar (2003) — where agents are longer-lived,
vocational agents have a higher probability of skill obsolescence, and both types of agents are free to choose
the sector they work for every period — is more suitable to address this issue. Such a model has the potential
of generating a higher earnings volatility of the vocationally educated. The qualitative behavior with respect
to educational policies in this more complicated setup is identical to that of the present model.
17Discounting across periods serves little purpose in our setup, and we have abstracted from it.
18The assumption that the subsidy yields utility directly is rationalized by the assumptions that agents
care about consumption in both periods of their lives, private credit markets are absent in this two-period
OLG framework, and the subsidy yields proportional consumption beneﬁts during the ﬁrst period of life.
103.5 Government Education Policy
We assume that the government spends a total amount of A ∗ G on education. This formu-
lation is consistent with education expenditures that are a constant fraction of GDP along
a balanced growth path. Given the threshold a∗ deﬁned above, the governments’ budget
constraint, assumed to hold period by period, is
a∗Sv +( 1− a∗)Sg = A ∗ G. (6)
Even though we do not explicitly model it, one may imagine the government collecting
taxes to ﬁnance education, through a proportional labor income tax. Given logarithmic
preferences, it is the ratio of wages that matters for the education decision, and a proportional
tax would not aﬀect this ratio, and therefore our analysis.
3.6 Equilibrium
Let ηg denote the fraction of young agents who obtained general education during the last
period and thus are available for work in the high-tech sector. At any point in time the
aggregate state of the economy is described by the vector z =( ηg,A,A f). In order to deﬁne
a recursive equilibrium we have to describe the law of motion for the state vector. Next
periods’ education allocation, η0
g, is determined by the decision of young households in the
current period; that is, η0
g =1− a∗. The frontier technology evolves exogenously according
to
A0
f = λAf. (7)
The commonly available technology next period, A0, is assumed to be the average level
of technology adopted by high-tech ﬁrms this period; that is19
A0 =
£





Individual adopting ﬁrms perceive themselves as small and therefore unable to aﬀect tomor-
row’s aggregate state A0 through their technology adoption decision today. It is the aggregate
technology A0 rather than the individual technology a0 that determines tomorrow’s starting
technology for an adopting ﬁrm; this makes its adoption problem, conditional on Eh, essen-
tially static. Adoption yields a technological advantage only in the current period, via higher
current proﬁts, before the competition catches up.
We can view the newly available technology as ﬁlled with “bugs”, and the process of
adoption as discovering these bugs and working around them in order to realize the potential
19This average is a cross-sectional average over the continuum of ﬁrms. We are implicitly assuming a law
of large numbers, which allows us to use the distribution function for productivity draws of a single ﬁrm, F,
as the population distribution.
11gains of the technology. In the subsequent period, when these bugs become known and ﬁxed,
a more robust technology is available to all. In this paradigm, (8) can be interpreted as the
expected number of bugs that are discovered this period and will be ﬁxed by the next period.
We can now deﬁne a recursive equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 1 A Recursive Equilibrium is a policy function for workers, Ig(a;z), ap o l i c y
function for nonadopting ﬁrms, nn(z), a value function V (Eh,n a;z) and policy functions for
the adopting ﬁrms, na(z), ¯ Eh(na;z),a 0(Eh,n a;z), wage functions Wn(z) and Wa(Eh,n a;z),
an education cut-oﬀ function a∗(z), government policy functions Sg(z),S v(z) and an aggre-
gate law of motion Φ mapping today’s aggregate state into tomorrow’s aggregate state such
that
1. Given wage functions, policy functions by ﬁrms, government policy, and the aggregate
law of motion, Ig(a;z) maximizes (5) for all a ∈ [0,1]. The education cut-oﬀ a∗(z)
satisﬁes
Ig(a,z)=1for all a ≥ a∗(z) and Ig(a,z)=0for all a ≤ a∗(z). (9)
2. Wn(z) and nn(z) satisfy (1).W a(Eh,n a,z) and na(z) satisfy (3).
3. The value function V (Eh,n a;z) solves Bellman equation (4) and ¯ Eh(na;z) is the as-
sociated optimal productivity cut-oﬀ.
4. Given Wa(Eh,n a,z), the technology adoption decision solves (2).
5. The government policy satisﬁes (6), given a∗(z).
6. The labor market clears: ηg = na(z) and 1 − ηg = nn(z).
7. The aggregate law of motion Φ is induced by the optimal policy functions Ig(a;z) and
a0(Eh,n a;z).
The last part of the deﬁnition can be explicitly stated in the following way: A0
f is given
by (7),A 0 is given by (8) and η0
g =1− a∗(z), where a∗(z) is in turn deﬁned by the optimal
education acquisition policy Ig(a;z) via (9).
3.7 Balanced Growth Path
In our analysis we will restrict ourselves to balanced growth path equilibria. We ﬁrst nor-
malize all growing variables by dividing by the level of the current technology, A. We let
x(Eh,n a)=
a0(Eh,na)
A denote the growth rate chosen by a generic adopting ﬁrm and by
E(x)=
£
1 − F( ¯ Eh (na))
¤−1 R
Eh≥ ¯ Eh x(Eh,n a)dF(Eh) the average growth rate of technology
of adopting ﬁrms, which by (8) equals the constant aggregate growth rate of the economy
along a balanced growth path.
123.7.1 Firms
Dividing the optimality condition for the nonadopting ﬁrms by A yields
wn = θβ(nnh)
θ−1 , (10)
where wn = Wn
A is the normalized wage in the nonadopting sector.
In the adopting sector, conditional on hiring na workers and drawing a productivity shock
Eh, the ﬁrm solves
π(na,E h)=m a x
x≤λ
x(naEh)
θ − wanaEh −
1
2
(x − 1)2, (11)
where the de-trended wage wa, taken as given by the ﬁrm, equals the marginal product
wa = θx(naEh)
θ−1 . (12)
The dynamic programming problem of the ﬁrm becomes
v(Eh,n a)= m a x
adopt, not adopt
½










A is the normalized value function and na ∈ argmaxn
R
v(Eh,n)dF(Eh)
is the optimal labor demand of the ﬁrm.
3.7.2 Households
Household preferences can be rewritten as (ignoring constants irrelevant for maximization)
u(a)=Ig {E log(waEh) − log(e(a)) + log(sg)} +( 1− Ig){log(wnh)+l o g ( sv)} (14)
where the subsidy levels sv = Sv
A and sg =
Sg
A of the government have to obey its budget
constraint
a∗sv +( 1− a∗)sg = G (15)
3.7.3 Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 2 A balanced growth path equilibrium is an optimal education decision for work-
ers, Ig(a), labor demand for nonadopting ﬁrms, nn, a value function v(Eh,n a) and polices
for the adopting ﬁrms, na, ¯ Eh(na),x(Eh,n a), wages wn and wa(Eh,n a), an education cut-
oﬀ function a∗, government policies sg,s v and an aggregate growth rate E(x) and education
allocation ηg such that
1. Given wages, Ig(a) maximizes (14) for all a ∈ [0,1].T h ee d u c a t i o nc u t - o ﬀ a∗ satisﬁes
Ig(a)=1for all a ≥ a∗ and Ig(a)=0for all a ≤ a∗. (16)
132. Wages satisfy (10) and (12).
3. The value function v(Eh,n a) solves Bellman equation (13) and ¯ Eh(na) is the associated
optimal productivity cut-oﬀ.
4. x(Eh,n a) solves (11).
5. The government policy satisﬁes (15), given a∗.
6. The labor market clears: ηg = na =1− a∗;1− ηg = nn.
7. The aggregate growth rate is given by
E(x)=
£





We will use s =
sg
sv as our educational policy variable; given s and G, the individual
subsidies (sg,s v) can be derived from the deﬁnition of s and equation (15).
4 Qualitative Characterization of the Balanced Growth Path
In a separate appendix, we analytically characterize the balanced growth path of this econ-
omy in detail and conduct comparative statics with respect to the policy parameters (f,C,s)
and the speed of technological innovation λ.20 In this section, we merely summarize these
results to highlight the forces behind the quantitative results and present the BGP conditions
used to compute them. The adopting ﬁrm’s problem is solved for a schedule, ¯ Eh(ηg) that
relates the optimal productivity threshold ¯ Eh, beyond which the ﬁrm chooses the adoption






from the households’ education problem — the productivity threshold ¯ Eh, with its implied
wage diﬀerential that is necessary to induce a given measure ηg of households to work in
the high-tech sector. These two schedules are combined to solve for the BGP education
allocation η∗
g and productivity threshold ¯ E∗
h.
4.1 The Firm Condition
The ﬁrst-order condition of the adopting ﬁrm’s problem in (11), conditional on an acceptable
Eh draw, motivates the deﬁnition of the threshold b Eh beyond which x = λ is optimal (i.e.


















20This appendix is available from the authors upon request. Alternatively, it can be found at
www.econ.upenn.edu/~dkrueger/appcr.pdf.
14There exist cutoﬀs η1
g and η3












either interior (when the draw Eh < b Eh) or maximal growth (when Eh ≥ b Eh)





only maximal growth occurs.21
Using the adopting ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions we obtain expressions for the growth rate,
adoption wage rate and adoption proﬁts. In all expressions, Ha = ηgEh, is stochastic.
Eh < b Eh (interior growth) Eh ≥ b Eh (maximal growth)
x =1+( Ha)












2θ πm(Eh,ηg)=( 1− θ)λ(Ha)
θ − 1
2 (λ − 1)
2 .
In Bellman equation (13), proﬁts π are an increasing function of Eh; the “dismiss” option
is decreasing in Eh. We therefore anticipate a threshold ¯ Eh ∈ [1,h] such that for all Eh < ¯ Eh
the ﬁrm ﬁres and searches for a better workforce-technology match and for all Eh ≥ ¯ Eh it
proceeds with production using the current workforce. Two cases arise. In the ﬁrst, ¯ Eh < b Eh,
and for some or all of the Eh draws for which the adoption option is chosen, maximal growth
will not result; therefore, the expected aggregate growth rate E (x) < λ. In the second,
¯ Eh ≥ b Eh, and for every draw of Eh for which the adoption option is chosen, maximal growth
will result; therefore, E (x)=λ.








































which holds with equality if ¯ Eh ∈ (0,1). The left hand side is the marginal cost of ﬁring the
workforce and waiting for a better draw and the right hand side is the marginal beneﬁto f
such a draw in the form of extra expected net proﬁts.22




curve is decreasing. As ηg increases, the ﬁring cost
increases linearly since it is paid for every person hired. Proﬁts increase, but less than
linearly, given diminishing returns to Ha.T h e r e f o r et h eﬁrm “experiments” less in adoption.
Additionally, proﬁts are high on account of high ηg, and therefore the ﬁrm does not have to
set a high productivity threshold in order to realize high proﬁts and meet adoption costs.













22When maximal growth results, the ﬁrm condition includes only the πm term, integrated from ¯ Eh to h.
15The dependence of the ﬁrm condition on ηg and the various parameters is given by
¯ Eh ≡ ¯ Eh
¡
ηg; f, C, λ
¢
.
−; −, −, +
For a given ηg, an increase in the unit ﬁring cost of labor, f, increases the marginal cost of
drawing another Eh, and the adopting ﬁrm experiments less and accepts lower productivity
matches for any given ηg;t h a ti s , ¯ Eh(ηg) decreases. An increase in the regulation cost, C,
decreases the beneﬁt of redrawing instead of increasing the marginal cost, but produces a
similar outcome.
There are two eﬀects of an increase in the growth rate of the available technology, λ.
Since the ﬁxed cost of adopting at the maximum rate, 1
2 (λ − 1)
2 , increases, the wage in the
adoption sector has to be low enough to keep proﬁts high. Therefore, the minimum adoption
labor supply, ηg, needed to induce the ﬁrm to adopt at the maximum possible rate increases,




threshold curve shifts rightward. Second, the expected proﬁtf r o mah i g h e r
draw increases, which makes ﬁrms more picky and thus increases the adoption threshold
¯ Eh(ηg).
4.2 The Household Condition
Assuming a parametric form for the cost function, e(a)=1
a,n o t i n gt h a ta∗ =1− ηg,a n d
recalling the deﬁnition of our education policy variable, s =
sg
sv, we can write the condition



























































which holds with equality if ¯ Eh ∈ (0,1). T h el e f th a n ds i d eo ft h i se x p r e s s i o nc a nb ev i e w e d
as the beneﬁt of general education in the form of higher expected wages, and the right hand
side as the cost, net of subsidy, which includes the foregone wages in the non-adoption sector
in addition to the disutility of general education.23





curve is increasing. As ηg increases, a downward pres-
sure on adoption wages arises, and the disutility of the marginal general education enrollee
23In the case of the maximal growth, only the second term within curly braces of the left hand side is
present, with the limits of integration being ¯ Eh and h.
16increases. To counter these, the productivity levels Eh > ¯ Eh with which the ﬁrm produces
and pays wages have to be suﬃciently high.
The dependence of the ﬁrm condition on ηg and the various parameters is given by
¯ EHH







As the subsidy for general education increases, households are willing to supply a given ηg
for lower thresholds ¯ Eh and thus lower wage premia. Expected adoption wages are increasing
in λ; therefore, such an increase induces supply of a given ηg even for lower thresholds ¯ Eh.24
4.3 Dependence of BGP Equilibrium on Parameters




and the increasing, continuous





we obtain a unique BGP. The intersection of the two sched-
ules yields the equilibrium education allocation
¡
ηg
¢∗ , and productivity threshold
¡ ¯ Eh
¢∗.
All other variables, such as the expected growth rate and expected wages on the BGP can

























The expected growth rate E(x) is increasing in the equilibrium values of both ηg and ¯ Eh.25
The dependence of the ﬁrm and household conditions on the parameters summarized
above allows us to characterize their qualitative impact on the BGP equilibrium. An increase
in the ﬁring cost parameter f shifts the ﬁrm condition downward. As a result, the equilibrium
threshold as well as the general education attainment and the expected growth rate decreases.
Figure 1 depicts this situation, as well as the components that go into determining the BGP
equilibrium. An increase of the entry cost parameter C works similarly.
An increase in the subsidy parameter, s, shifts the household’s condition down, reducing
the equilibrium productivity threshold, but increasing general education attainment. If the
latter eﬀect dominates, expected growth increases. As the eﬀective cost of general education
decreases with higher s, households require a lower threshold productivity and wage premium
to choose general education.26




threshold curve shifts to the right when λ increases,











, this equation reduces to E (x)=λ.






. We have abstracted from discounting in our setup for sake of simplicity; the














Increase in ‘f’ or ‘C’ 
moves intersection 
from Ex = λ to Ex < λ.
Êh(ηg) 
Firms: Ēh(ηg)
Figure 1: Eﬀect of an increase in f, C
Analyzing the dependence of the BGP equilibrium on the speed of technology availability,
λ, is more complicated because all three schedules — b Eh(ηg) (shifts right), ¯ Eh(ηg) (shifts
up), and ¯ EHH
h (ηg) (shifts right) are aﬀected. The impact on the equilibrium productivity
threshold ¯ Eh is ambiguous, whereas the equilibrium general education attainment increases
unambiguously; the increase in the maximal growth rate increases the expected wage in the
adoption sector and therefore the incentive to acquire general education.
What happens to the US-Europe growth gap when λ increases? In Figure 2, we hold the
household curves at their old positions to achieve graphical tractability; the US household
curve lies below Europe’s, as a higher subsidy parameter, s, is assumed for the US. The
accompanying box explains how the growth gap, initially zero, can expand with an increase




,i si m p o r t a n tf o rt h i s
possibility. While the shifts of the ﬁrm and household conditions increase the equilibrium
general education attainment for Europe, the productivity threshold corresponding to this
increased attainment may still fall short of the new b Eh needed for maximum growth. Alter-
nately, the wages in the adopting sector have to be low enough to induce the ﬁrm to adopt
at the higher maximum speed. In the US, where general education subsidy and attainment
are higher, ηg c a ne x c e e de v e nt h ei n c r e a s e dc u t o ﬀ η1
g. It may therefore continue to grow at










Ex = λ for both US and Europe initially. 
When λ increases, US intersection is still 
above the Êh curve, implying Ex = λ , but 
for Europe the intersection is below the Êh 
line, implying Ex < λ. Household curves 
shift out as well, but are held constant here 
for simplicity; the growth gap will increase 
if these do not shift too much. 
Europe 
US 
Figure 2: Dependence of the US-Europe growth gap on λ
Our analytical characterization reveals the qualitative, in some cases ambiguous, impact
of the policy variables (f,C,s) on the BGP equilibrium. However, the quantiﬁcation of
the relative importance of each policy’s contribution to the US-Europe growth gap requires
experimenting with counterfactual experiments using a calibrated version of the model. We
turn to this next.
5C a l i b r a t i o n
We choose a model period to represent roughly T =2 0years. We have assumed that a
newly adopted technology becomes “common practice” within one model period. Atkeson
and Kehoe (2001) discuss the diﬀusion of electricity in US manufacturing establishments,
and report that the time required for the technology to diﬀuse from 5% to 50% “occurred
over the 20 years from 1899 to 1919.” Therefore, a choice of 20 years for a model period
seems to be a reasonable start.27
Parameters describing the production technology, (λ,θ,β), maximum task-speciﬁcp r o -
ductivity, h, its distribution F, and government policy (C,f,s) need to be chosen. We ﬁrst
27The technology of the integrated circuit was invented in 1959 and found large scale use in the personal
computer in 1981, a bit more than 20 years later. And the full potential of the personal computer, in turn,
was unleashed with the pervasive use of the internet nearly another 20 years later. These observations lend
further credibility to our choice of the length of a model period.
Note that our choice of period length has bearing on the interpretation of the magnitudes of some of the
parameters in the model, in particular the gross growth rate of the frontier technology λ and the ﬁring cost
f.
19pick a subset of “predetermined” parameters motivated by independent empirical evidence.
The remaining parameters are then chosen so that our model broadly matches selected em-
pirical growth and education allocation statistics.
5.1 Predetermined Parameters
The share parameter θ in the production function is set to 0.35. Recall that the production
function is of the form AHθ. Since H represents eﬀective units of labor, one can view θ as
the intensity on raw labor as well as on human capital. For instance, the production function




θ ; with our choice of θ =0 .35, the labor share in this
sector equals the commonly assumed value of 0.7. Klenow and Rodriguez (1997) explicitly
write the production function as Y = KαHγ (AL)
1−α−γ , and use values of γ =0 .28 and
α =0 .3, which implies that 1−α−γ =0 .42. In choosing θ =0 .35, we slightly overstate the
human capital intensity and understate the labor intensity, compared to their study.
In order to calibrate the relative education subsidies s for both the US and Europe
we directly use expenditure per student data in PPP dollars. We use upper secondary
expenditure as a proxy for sv, and university tertiary expenditure as a proxy for sg. The values
for these from OECD (2001, Table B1.1) imply sUS = 19802
7764 =2 .55,s GER = 10139
9519 =1 .07,
sIT = 6295
6340 =0 .99. We synthesize this information by choosing sUS =2 .55 and sEUR =1as
our education policy parameters.28
Finally, we choose the distribution over productivity draws, F, to be uniform over its
support [1,h], thus avoiding the introduction of further free parameters. The predetermined
parameters are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2
Predetermined Parameters
Parameter θ sUS sEUR F(Eh)
Value 0.35 2.55 1 Eh−1
h−1
5.2 Parameters Chosen to Match Observations
As discussed in Section 2, US manufacturing labor productivity grew roughly at 2.5% ay e a r
in the 70s-80s and 4% in the 90s and beyond. Recall our assumption that the US grows
at the potential rate in both periods; therefore, we choose λ =( 1 .025)
20 for the rate of
28Germany and Italy also have data on per pupil expenditure in Tertiary type B programs that “tend to
focus on occupationally-speciﬁc skills intended for direct labor market entry.” (p. 129) and on post-secondary
non-tertiary programs, such as “vocational certiﬁcates in ... the United States,” or “vocational training in the
dual system for holders of general upper secondary qualiﬁcations in Germany.” For Germany, these ﬁgures
are $5,422 and $10,924, and for Italy, $6283 and $6,458 respectively. For the US, there is no data for these
categories. For Germany, there is a big disparity between these two ﬁgures and the use of the upper secondary
ﬁgure appears to be a reasonable via media. For Italy, it does not matter much which ﬁgure is used.
20technological change that prevailed until 1980, and the increased rate λ0 =( 1 .04)
20 for the
period beyond. As mentioned in the introduction, the European productivity growth rates
— roughly the same as the US in earlier period, but, as seen in Table 1, distinctly lower at
around 3% a year during the latter period — are empirical targets.
How do the above choices for λ compare with the independent evidence available on the
change in the growth rate of available technologies? Cummings and Violante (2002) compute
an aggregate index of investment-speciﬁc (embodied) technical change, and report that it
grew at a rate of 3% a year until 1975 and reached an average annual rate in excess of 6%
in the 90s. If we assume that this change, besides augmenting the quality of (unmodeled)
capital, also augments labor as in the Klenow and Rodriguez (1997) production function,
our variable A i nt h em o d e lw o u l dh a v et og r o wa tr a t e sc l o s et o2 %a n d4 %i nt h et w o
periods.29
In order to calibrate the remaining parameters β,h,f,C, both for the US and Europe,
we attempt to make our model match the following empirical statistics (with λ0 as rate of
technological change, and all other parameters set to their values described above):
• Observations on entry costs are mainly used to pin down C, the share of proﬁts not
accruing to the entrepreneur.30 U s i n gd a t ao no ﬃcial cost of entry procedures from
the “Entry Regulations” part of the “Doing Business” database of the World Bank we
ﬁnd, that, as a percentage of gross national income, that cost is 0.6% for the US, 5.8%
for Germany, and 22.7% for Italy. For the US we use, as a benchmark target, a ratio
of entUS =0=CUS,a n df o rE u r o p ew eu s et h eG e r m a nv a l u eo fentEUR =0 .058,
since the extremely high value for Italy is an outlier within the EU.31 Indeed, the
more comprehensive index for barriers to entrepreneurship constructed by Nicoletti,
Scarpetta, and Boylaud (1999) — US: 1.3, Germany: 2.1, Italy: 2.7, with 0 being least
regulated and 6 most — suggests that Italy fares only slightly worse than Germany in
29With a residual capital intensity of 0.3, and the assumed raw labor intensity of 0.35, the growth rate of A
in our model should be 0.65 times the growth rate of the reported technical change. Our assumption that the
technical change is capital- and raw-labor-augmenting lies in between the assumptions that it is only capital
augmenting and it is neutral. In another highly relevant study, Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) suggest
rates of technical change of 3% until the 70s and 5% beyond.
30It is understood that all parameters discussed below aﬀect all equilibrium quantities, albeit to diﬀerent
degrees. We associate a parameter with the statistic whose equilibrium behavior it most aﬀects.
The use of an alternate calibration strategy that associates C with the tax rate on corporate proﬁts, 35%
for the US and 50% for Europe, does not alter our conclusions signiﬁcantly. While net proﬁts consumed by
entrepreneurs is obviously sensitive to C, the equilibrium allocations and growth rate are not.
31As we will document below, this parameter does not have a large eﬀect on equilibrium allocations.
The entry cost database is described in Djankov, La Porta, Silanes, and Shleifer (2001) and can be found
in http://rru.worldbank.org/DoingBusiness/TopicReports/EntryRegulations.aspx.

















where the numerator is the expected (or aggregate) total cost paid by adoption ﬁrms
and the denominator is the GDP of the economy.
• Firing costs are used to mainly pin down f. We set f =0for the US; for Europe we
set f in such a way that ﬁring a worker once costs 6 weeks of her average wage in the
model, as suggested by Nagypál (2001).32 Given that our model period is 20 years, we










• The fraction of population with general education, ηg, for the US will be used
to mainly pin down h. Education attainment data from OECD 2001 (tables A2.1.a
and C2.1) is used to calculate ηg.33 We realistically assume that workers with lower
secondary education or less are not able to work in the high-tech sector. In dividing
the upper secondary education attainment into “vocational” and “general”, we have
assumed that enrollment mirrors attainment: vocational enrollments of 6.8% for the
US, and 64.6% for Germany and Italy.34 As described in footnote 28, we associate post-
secondary non-tertiary education and tertiary B education with vocational education.
University tertiary education counts toward general education. Based on these ﬁgures
we compute the fractions of agents with general education as, ηUS
g =0 .745, ηGER
g =
32A sd i s c u s s e di nS e c t i o n3 . 3 ,f cannot be set exactly to zero as the ﬁrms’ Bellman equation may not have
a solution. We set it to a very small number for the US, corresponding to less than one day of average wages.
Our results are not sensitive to this choice.
Pries and Rogerson (2001) consider a range of values for the real resource costs involved in dismissing a
w o r k e r ,t h em a x i m u mo fw h i c hi s1 0 %o fquarterly wages in the model (i.e. 2.5% of yearly wages). Lazear
(1990) presents data on the number of months of salary given to workers upon dismissal after 10 years of
service. It is zero for the US, 1 month for Germany, and 15.86 months for Italy! Nicoletti et.al. provide
indices for employment protection legislation: 0.2 for the US, 2.8 for Germany, and 3.3. for Italy on a 0 to 6
scale. The World Bank entry costs database mentioned earlier also give an index measure — 0.94 for the US,
1.75 for Germany, and 1.35 for Italy. While there is variation in the exact magnitude of costs reported, the
relative ranking of ﬁring costs is preserved across the US and “Europe”.
33For the US, 5% of the population has only primary education, 8% lower secondary, 51% upper secondary,
0% post-secondary non-tertiary, 8% tertiary B, and 27% university tertiary. These ﬁgures are 2%, 17%, 53%,
5%, 10%, and 13% for Germany, and 25%, 32%, 30%, 4%, 0%, and 9% for Italy.
34The 6.8% ﬁgure for the US is the percentage of students who completed 30% or more of all credits in
speciﬁc labor market preparation courses in 1990. See Medrich, Kagehiro, and Houser (1994).
220.317 and ηIT
g =0 .196. As calibration targets we therefore choose ηUS
g =0 .745 In
contrast to policy parameters, where there exist obvious diﬀerences across the US and
Europe, it is less obvious that the parameter h ought to vary across regions. We thus
choose h to roughly match the US education attainment and use the same h for Europe.
The (in)-ability of the model to match the European education attainment is then an
important quantitative test of the model. In other words, the US education attainment
is used in the calibration, while the European attainment of ηEUR
g ≈ 0.2 − 0.3 is an
empirical target.
• The wage premium is used to mainly determine β, the constant in the production
function of the nonadopting sector. At the heart of our model is the endogenous ed-
u c a t i o nd e c i s i o nb yh o u s e h o l d s ,w h i c hi sd r i v e nb yr e l a t i v ew a g e si nt h et w os e c t o r s .
It is therefore important to calibrate our model to be consistent with empirically mea-
sured premia for general education in both regions. The OECD (1997, Table E4.1a)
provides the relative earnings of persons aged 25-64 (normalizing income of workers
with upper secondary education to 100). These ﬁgures are given for tertiary and non-
university tertiary (vocational) categories. For the US the numbers are 174 and 119,
for Germany 163 and 111. For the US we thus obtain a general education wage pre-
mium wpUS = 174
119 =1 .46. For Germany this ratio is wpGER =1 .47, slightly higher.35
We use the German value as our target for Europe. In particular, note that this pre-
mium diﬀers from the “college premium”. In the model, the corresponding statistic is











Parameter λ λ0 h CUS CEUR fUS fEUR βUS βEUR
Value 1.64 2.19 2.4 0.0 0.34 0.0 0.011 0.76 2.05
Our procedure for selecting parameters yields results summarized in Table 3. Obtaining
this table involves computing the balanced growth equilibrium with candidate parameter
values by using the ﬁrm and household conditions, (17) and (19), discussed in Section 4, until
the calibration targets are matched to a satisfactory degree. In the next section we report
how well the model outcomes and target statistics match, before turning to counterfactual
policy experiments.36
35The non-university tertiary wage is unavailable for Italy.
36Note that the value for the non-adoption production function parameter, β, w h i c hi sc h o s e nt om a t c ht h e
236 Quantitative Results
We present our quantitative analysis in two steps. First, we assess whether the model can
qualitatively and, more importantly, quantitatively match the key empirical targets set out
in the previous section, both for the US and Europe at diﬀerent points of time. Since it turns
out that the model outcomes broadly match the data, we next use it to “decompose” the
recent US-Europe productivity growth diﬀerentials by diﬀerences in the proxies for policies
— the product market friction, C, labor market friction, f, and focus on general education,
s.
6.1 Quantitative Evaluation of Model
In Table 4 we summarize the quantitative predictions of our model.37 All variables with
primes refer to the 1990s. Recall that we chose a total of 9 parameters to match 9 calibration
targets.38 The model attains its calibration targets almost exactly (which is not automatic,
since model statistics are nonlinear functions of model parameters and a system of 9 equations
in 9 variables does not always have a solution).
There were a total of 12 empirical statistics we reported in the previous section, so that
we have three “overidentifying restrictions” — European growth rates in both periods and its
education allocation were not part of the calibration. The model does very well in almost
exactly matching these empirical targets as well; these targets and the corresponding model
outcomes are highlighted in bold in Table 4. These ﬁndings give us some conﬁdence that our
model indeed allows us to decompose, in the next subsection, the recent growth diﬀerentials
between the US and Europe in a quantitatively meaningful way.
Table 4
Targets and Model Predictions
Variable US, Target US, Model Europe, Target Europe, Model
E(x) 2.5% 2.5% 2.9% 2.5%
E(x)0 4% 4% 3% 3.2%
η0
g 74.5% 74% 30% 31%
wp0 1.46 1.46 1.47 1.47
fir0 0 0 6 weeks 6 weeks
ent0 0 0 0.058% 0.058%
wage premium of an economy, is higher for Europe than the US. This calibration outcome is reminiscent of
the much-documented “wage compression” in Europe. See, for instance, Acemoglu (2002) and the references
therein.
37The growth rates are presented on an annual basis.
38Strictly speaking, we only set out to match 7 statistics, since our choices of λ,λ
0 only enable, but do not
ensure that the model matches selected productivity growth observations.
24The model also predicts how education allocations and wage premia, both in Europe as
well as in the US, change in response to the increased speed at which technologies arrive.
As demonstrated in the theoretical part of our paper and conﬁrmed in Table 5, the model
predicts an increase in the share of the population with general education. The non-prime
variables, again highlighted in bold, were not part of the calibration. Evidently, the increase
for Europe is not strong enough to cause the corresponding productivity threshold to exceed
the cutoﬀ needed for maximal growth.39
What is not obvious from the theoretical analysis is the response of the wage premium to
a change in λ; on one hand the supply of generally skilled workers increases, on the other hand
faster technology adoption fuels higher demand for those workers. The theoretical eﬀect on
the wage premium is ambiguous, but, as Table 5 shows, the demand eﬀect dominates in both
cases and leads to an increase in the wage premium in both regions; the eﬀect is stronger
for the US. Even though the wage premium of our model refers to workers with general,
relative to those with vocational education, rather than to workers with college vs. high
school education, it is interesting that the above prediction is broadly consistent with the
empirical evidence (for example, see Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997).
Table 5
Ancillary Model Statistics







6.2 Decomposition of Recent US-Europe Growth Diﬀerentials
We are now in a position to perform a model-based decomposition of the growth gap that
emerged in the 1990s between Europe and the US. We start with the European situation in
the 1990s( s e ec o l u m n5 of Table 4). We then sequentially reduce the product market friction
to zero (C =0 ) , then the labor market friction also to zero (f =0 ) , and ﬁnally increase the
education subsidy to US levels, thus arriving at the US situation (see column 3 of Table 4).
For all experiments we adjust β in such a way as to keep the wage premium constant at the
empirically observed value. Table 6 summarizes the results of this thought experiment.
39The European Competitiveness Report 2001 bemoans the lack of adaptability of the labor force to new
technologies: “... in recent years skill shortages in important technology areas have been reported in several
European countries... It appears that, unlike in previous years, when the long-term trend increase in the
demand for skills was met by the supply of technology professionals from the educational system, the surge
in demand for ICT-related skills in the 1990s found no corresponding supply forthcoming.”
25Table 6
Decomposition of Growth Gap
Variable/Parameter Europe Eur., C = CUS Eur., C = CUS,f = fUS US
E(x) 3.20% 3.23% 3.38% 4%
ηg 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.74
¯ Eh 1.98 2.05 2.36 2.39
β 2.05 2.03 1.96 0.76
Our key ﬁnding is that the majority of the growth gap stems from diﬀerences in edu-
cational policy. Columns 2 and 3 of the table demonstrate that a reduction of the share
of GDP lost to regulation from 6% to 0% only increases the growth rate by three-hundreds
of one percent and leaves the education allocation almost unchanged. Only the threshold
productivity ¯ Eh increases somewhat, by about 4%.
The growth gap explained by the ﬁring cost is more sizeable, amounting to 0.15 percent-
age points. Lower ﬁring costs allow ﬁrms to wait for more productive draws and yield higher
expected wages in the adoption sector, increasing the fraction of the population opting for
general education.
The relatively modest growth eﬀects of labor and product market frictions implied by
our model therefore leave the bulk of the growth gap, 0.62 percentage points, to be explained
by the marked diﬀerence in educational focus between the US and Europe. Our quantitative
results are not sensitive to the sequential order in which European labor, product market
and education policies are changed to their corresponding US values: increasing s from 1 to
2.55 and leaving f,C at their European values again attributes more than 0.6 percentage
points of the growth gap (of the 0.8 points predicted by the model) to diﬀerences in education
policies.
An alternate decomposition, which views the parameter β as structural and maintains it
at the prevailing value of 2.05 for Europe, is shown in Table 7. While the gap between Europe
and the US cannot quite be bridged (suggesting that policies easing wage compression might
warrant further attention), the education policy diﬀerence continues to account for most of
the growth gap.
Table 7
Decomposition of Growth Gap — constant β
Variable/Parameter Europe Eur., C = CUS Eur., C = CUS,f = fUS “US”
E(x) 3.20% 3.22% 3.35% 3.81%
ηg 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.57
β 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05
Our results are of course speciﬁc to the model we use, but may at least suggest that Eu-
rope’s (especially Germany’s and Italy’s) focus on vocational education held these countries
26back in a quantitatively signiﬁcant way in the ICT-age of the 90s.
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In Section 5.2, we counted anyone with a college degree toward ηg. However, it is not obvious
that college graduates with little technical or professional background should be included
in this category. For instance, Ingram and Neumann (2000) analyze returns to various
dimensions of skill to argue that variations in mathematical ability accounted for a signiﬁcant
portion of the recent increase in within-group income inequality of college graduates. This
suggests that not all college graduates are likely to be suited for employment in high-tech
industries. Therefore, now we net out the humanities, arts, and education graduates from the
general education pool.40 Proceeding as we did earlier, we obtain ηUS
g =0 .672, ηGER
g =0 .288
and ηIT
g =0 .178. We therefore aim for a reduced empirical target for Europe of ηEUR
g ≈ 0.25.
Recalibration yields the analogues of Tables 3 and 6, which are presented as Tables 8 and 9.
While Table 6 provides a slightly better ﬁt of the growth rate targets, we can see that our
basic conclusion is unchanged in Table 9; the bulk of the growth gap between the US and
Europe remains to be explained by the diﬀerence in education policy.41
Table 8
Calibrated Parameters — modiﬁed ηg
Parameter λ λ0 h CUS CEUR fUS fEUR βUS βEUR
Value 1.64 2.19 2.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0108 0.9 2.34
Table 9
Decomposition of Growth Gap — modiﬁed ηg
Variable/Parameter Europe Eur., C = CUS Eur., C = CUS,f = fUS US
E(x) 2.89% 2.90% 3.02% 3.83%
ηg 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.69
¯ Eh 1.68 1.75 1.99 1.99
β 2.34 2.37 2.29 0.9
We have ﬁxed the measure of each type of ﬁrm at one in our quantitative exercise.
Abstracting from the entry decision of ﬁrms considerably improves the tractability of our
model. Nevertheless, it is interesting to explore the robustness of our quantitative analysis
to entry. We do this by assuming that there is a ﬁxed resource cost AKn and AKa of setting
40We use graduation data from 1999 and assume that attainment in the population mirrors it (see Table
C4.3 in OECD, 2001)).
41When β is held constant at 2.34, the analogue of Table 7 is obtained. Here too most of the growth gap
is explained by the diﬀerence in s.
27up a non-adopting and an adopting ﬁrm, respectively.42 Let µn,µ a denote the equilibrium














, and ηg/µa replacing ηg. The following two free-entry
conditions, which equate entry costs to expected proﬁts, are the additional equations needed
to solve for the two new BGP variables, µn and µa.
Kn = πn(ηg,µ n)
Ka =
1











´ πm(ηg,µ a,E h)dF(Eh)
#
.
To impose discipline in our quantitative exercise, we normalize the measures µn,µ a to one
for the 1990s for both US and Europe. This implies that the ﬁxed costs equal the respective
equilibrium proﬁts. We then use these K’s to recompute the equilibrium for the earlier time
period, and produce the analogues of Table 4 and 5, allowing the measure of ﬁrms to vary
freely.43 This strategy does not amount to calibrating the K’s to observable targets, which
are, in any case, diﬃcult to identify in data. Nevertheless, it should allow us to verify that
our baseline calibration and decomposition do not result only because the ﬁxed factor of
entrepreneurial capital is held constant when λ increases to λ0.W e o b t a i n Kn and Ka of
0.42 and 1.03 for the US, and 1.59 and 0.44 for Europe. Except for an η0
g of 73.5% for the
US, instead of 74%, the numbers are virtually unchanged from Table 4. Table 10 presents
the analogue of Table 5.
Table 10
Ancillary Model Statistics — varying µ













n equal 1 for both regions,
the above table indicates that the main eﬀect of incorporating entry in this fashion is a drop
in the measure of non-adopting ﬁrms in the US. This depresses demand for vocationally
educated labor and increases the wage premium by a higher amount than seen in Table 5.
42Kn and Ka are to be viewed as technological variables, unlike the policy variable, C,i n t r o d u c e de a r l i e r .
43Given our normalization, Tables 6 and 7 are unchanged.
287C o n c l u s i o n
The roles of labor market rigidities and excessive regulation in explaining US-Europe growth
diﬀerences have been studied extensively. In this paper, we draw attention to another pos-
sible cause — the focus on skill-speciﬁc education in Europe. Our quantitative analysis with
a calibrated version of our model shows that the role of education may be signiﬁcant. Ed-
ucational reform, in the form of higher ﬂexibility in educational choices made at the upper
secondary level, and a greater focus on general education might be important in reducing
the US-Europe growth gap that has emerged since the mid 80s.
As conceded above, our model may be geared towards ﬁnding a signiﬁcant role for educa-
tion. For instance, the education decision determines occupational choice forever. Relaxing
this assumption would likely attribute a greater eﬀect to labor market frictions and other
impediments to occupational mobility. Indeed, it might be hard to completely disentan-
gle the educational and labor market aspects in practice. Likewise, a model of entry and
entrepreneurship is likely to ﬁnd a more important role for product market and other regu-
lations. Extending the model along these dimensions is a subject for future research.
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